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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 







Defendants / Respondents 







Appeal from the District Court of the 1st Judicial District for Kootenai County. Honorable 
Benjamin R. Simpson, District Judge presiding. 
Curtis Jay Johnson, prose, residing at 1206 N. 6th St. Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814, Appellant. 
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Table of Cases and Authorities 
(Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 56(c), Hei v. Holzer, 73 P.3d 94, 139 Idaho 81) 
Loomis v. City of Haley, 119 Idaho 434, 807 p.2d 1272 (1991) 
Statement of the Case & Course of the Proceedings 
The Court of Appeals remanded the respondents' motion for summary judgment on the 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress to the District Court for a determination of 
whether Mike McPhee was aware of the appellant's particularly fragile emotional state, 
such that ifhe was, the appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment on that claim should be 
denied. 
The presiding Honorable Judge John Patrick Luster subsequently withdrew from the case 
due to a conflict that was revealed by the appellant. The case was eventually assigned to 
Honorable District Court Judge Benjamin R. Simpson, who ordered briefs filed by the 
parties, and then ruled that Mike McPhee was not sufficiently notified that the Appellant 
was frail and particularly susceptible to emotional injury, and granted Summary Judgment 
to the respondents. 
Statement of the Facts 
In 2005 Mike McPhee made two part payments to Jay Johnson for Johnson's work on the 
Radiant Lake Estates Project. When Johnson asked for a third, and then begged, McPhee 
refused. Johnson then contacted Jack V anderwaal (JCA V) to secure further payment. 
There was a discussion of the matter between JCAV and McPhee, after which JCAV 
refused and referred Johnson back to McPhee, who JCA V said was going to be making all 
the money on the man made lake deal. 
1 
Mike McPhee was apparently very irritated that Johnson had contacted JCA V. Within 
further discussions between Johnson and McPhee, McPhee called Johnson a deranged 
motherfucker, a fly on his ass, and told Johnson no one would believe him, about being 
tortured by McPhee, because he was crazy. McPhee left abusive voice mails taunting 
Johnson about money, knowing Johnson was a desperate, deranged, helpless beggar. 
All of this despite the two having been best friends and despite Johnson doing exemplary 
and successful work setting up the Radiant Lake Estates project, and earlier finding and 
twice brokering a million dollars in profit deal for the respondents .. 
At the time of the abuse, Johnson was mentally crippled by McPhee's earlier torture, and 
his deathly trauma and perpetual suffering was violently exacerbated. 
Issues presented on Appeal 
The District Court has erred in four primary and crucial ways in its ruling. Firstly, and 
most crucially, the District Court has substantially altered the central question, or issue 
framed by the Court of Appeals to be considered on remand. Secondly, in answering the 
altered question, the District Court has misconstrued and mitigated the evidence in favor 
of the respondents. Thirdly,. the District Court has largely ignored or severely mitigated 
the context within which the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress occurred. Lastly, 
the District Court has included irrelevant evidence and testimony in answering the altered 
question. The District Court also erred by generally ignoring or missing the severity and 
extreme nature ofMcPhee's conduct, the case in general and Johnson's injury. 
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Appellant's Argument 
The District Court has substantially altered the central question, or issue framed 
by the Court of Appeals to be considered on remand. 
The Court of Appeals stated: 
"Thus, the existence or non-existence of a duty of care and proximate causation in 
this case turns upon whether McPhee was aware of Johnson's abnonnal 
vulnerability and the consequent risk of serious emotional injury from McPhee' s 
insults." 
"the court may draw the inferences it deems most reasonable concerning whether 
McPhee had knowledge or sufficient notice that Johnson's mental or emotional 
fragility made him vulnerable to serious emotional distress from McPhee's alleged 
misconduct." ( emphasis added) 
The District Court stated: 
"The question is whether Johnson's statement was sufficient to put McPhee on 
notice that any further derogatory comments, or comments involving foul 
language or concerning whether Mr. Johnson's suffered from a mental illness, 
would result in emotional distress to Mr. Johnson." (emphasis added) 
The Court further stated: 
"This Court holds that Mr. Johnson's vague statement to Mr. McPhee does not 
create a genuine issue as to whether Mr. McPhee was put on notice that Mr. 
Johnson was hindered by a particularly sensitive emotional state ... " ( emphasis 
added) 
The Court erred, since the issue was not whether McPhee was put on notice, but whether 
he was aware of Johnson's condition, whether he knew or should have known. The 
means whereby this awareness or knowledge arose was certainly not limited by the Court 
of Appeals to whether McPhee was properly notified by Johnson. 
The District Court stated: 
3 
"The record only appears to contain a single statement, however, regarding 
whether McPhee may have been apprised of Mr. Johnson's delicate mental and 
emotional state." ( emphasis added) 
Again, the District Court erred, since the question was not whether McPhee was apprised 
of Johnson's condition, but whether he was aware of it, whether he knew or should have 
known about it, by whatever means that knowledge might have arisen. The District Court 
posits that the only way McPhee could have known Johnson was particularly frail, or be 
held responsible for knowing, was if Johnson told him in very clear language. The issue as 
posed to the District Court on remand is certainly not thus limited. 
McPhee was clearly aware of Johnson's condition, he had knowledge ofit, since he 
called Johnson a deranged motherfucker, and said, ''No one will believe you, you're 
crazy." (Vol. I, p. 103, 2nd paragraph) (Vol 1, p. 196, pg 92, In 9-14) He also repeatedly 
snickered at Johnson's feeble weakness. (JCAV Tr.2, P 14-95, Johnson) (Vol. I, p. 182-
183, pg 94-95) 
Furthermore, it wasn't necessary to apprise anyone of Johnson's condition, it was obvious 
to everyone. Johnson by this time was a deranged, crippled, beggar, near death, rumored 
around town to be a pedophile, rapist or stalker. (Vol. 2, p.391, 2nd paragraph) Anyone 
and everyone who saw Johnson was struck by his derangement. (Vol 1, p.101, 4th 
paragraph) 
McPhee was aware that Johnson was penniless and a beggar, and his response was to 
leave Johnson two voice mails saying "Hey you fucking dickhead, why don't you call me 
back, I need to borrow some money, you never loaned me a nickel, you fucking prick." 
(Vol 2, p. 375) This is specific evidence that being aware of Johnson's condition did not 
alter McPhee's penchant for abusing him, however, the District Court completely ignored 
this evidence in its ruling. The District Court ignored all the evidence that McPhee was 
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aware that Johnson was crazy, despite the evidence being clearly stated in the 
respondent's Brief on remand. (P. 0048 - 0049) 
The District Court stated: 
"However, there is no indication that Mr. Johnson told Mr. McPhee that his 
attempts to heal, or his strange bodily experiences, were somehow catalyzed or 
exacerbated by McPhee's statements to Johnson." 
At the time Johnson told McPhee of his strange bodily experiences and attempts to heal, 
the relationship between Johnson and McPhee was normalized. McPhee was not making 
abusive statements. (Vol. 1 p.101, 2nd and 3rd paragraphs) 
Regardless, the issue on remand is not whether McPhee was apprised sufficiently by 
Johnson of Johnson's frail condition, but rather whether he was aware ofit. 
The District Court has misconstrued and mitigated the evidence in favor of the 
respondents. 
The District Court stated: 
"This Court holds that Mr. Johnson's vague statement to Mr. McPhee does not 
create a genuine issue as to whether Mr. McPhee was put on notice that Mr. 
Johnson was hindered by a particularly sensitive emotional state ... " ( emphasis 
added) 
"It really fucked me up when you told me to suck your dick" is not a vague statement 
whatsoever, especially not in this context. By the time of this statement Johnson was 
obviously crazy, everyone who knew Johnson or saw Johnson knew it. McPhee especially 
knew it, because he caused it. He knew perfectly well what Johnson was talking about. 
It was a huge and brave step for Johnson to make that "vague" statement. It could hardly 
be demanded of Johnson to further elaborate after McPhee's miscreant reply, "I don't 
know what you're talking about," especially considering that Johnson fainted at 
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the thought of confronting McPhee. (Vol.2, p.390, 3rd paragraph) 
Court must liberally construe the facts in favor of the non-moving party and 
determine whether there is any genuine issue as to any material fact and whether 
the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. 
(Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 56(c), Hei v. Holzer, 73 P.3d 94, 139 Idaho 81) 
The District Court has misconstrued and mitigated the evidence in favor of the moving 
party. 
The District Court stated: 
"Johnson asserts that in 2005 he told McPhee that his crude sexual advances 
negatively impacted Johnson." 
Johnson never referred to McPhee' s rapacious psycho-sexual mind torture as sexual 
advances. (Vol 1, p.99, 2-Jrd paragraph) (Vol. 1, p.183, pg. 95, In. 1-25) They were 
not sexual advances by anyone's testimony. McPhee testified that he never made any such 
statement, either in jest or otherwise. (Vol. 1, p.91) In referring to the torturous conduct 
as sexual advances, the District Court reveals that it has construed the evidence in favor of 
the moving party, i.e. sexual advances do not cause PTSD or derangement. 
Furthermore, Johnson could not have told McPhee what had been the overwhelming cause 
of his being "fucked up" or of his chaotic bodily experiences at the time of these 
conversations. Johnson was unaware at the time that his condition was caused by 
imagining himself being violently sodomized by McPhee. Once Johnson saw himself, and 
the crippled twisted nature of his abdominal area in the "Look Your Heart in the Mirror'' 
video, he realized. The psychosomatic experience was so horrible and devastating, that 
Johnson had completely repressed it. 
The District Court stated in describing altercations initiated by Johnson: 
"Via text message, he (Johnson) also told McPhee that he was an ass." 
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After months of polite requests and pleadings and finally begging to get paid as McPhee 
promised, for the work McPhee hired Johnson to do, which Johnson successfully did; 
Johnson had reached his wit's end. Johnson thought and hoped perhaps McPhee would 
respond differently to another kind of communication, more his style. Up to this point, 
Johnson had never been even slightly anything other than a perfect friend and business 
associate to McPhee. He was "polite calm and reasonable" in seeking the promised 
payment from McPhee. (Vol. 1, p.291, last paragraph) 
McPhee had refused to sign a contract when Johnson asked, and coerced Johnson to 
accept payment under the table .... " (Vol 1, p.171-172, pg. 50, ln.14 - pg 53, In. 2) And 
it was revealed he committed felony perjury lying to a notary about being a partner in 
JCA V. (Vol. 2, p.229-230) 
McPhee was a criminal, and his rapacious abusive behavior toward Johnson was 
sociopathic and purely evil. Johnson's finally calling him an ass does not justify or explain 
anything McPhee did. To infer that Johnson somehow had the abuse coming for 
calling McPhee an ass, or denying Johnson justice for finally calling him one would be 
unreasonable and unconscionable. 
The District Court has largely ignored or severely mitigated the context within 
which the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress occurred. 
The District Court stated: 
"This Court holds that Mr. Johnson's vague statement to Mr. McPhee does not 
create a genuine issue as to whether Mr. McPhee was put on notice that Mr. 
Johnson was hindered by a particularly sensitive emotional state, which could be 
exacerbated even by statements which are seemingly innocuous and certainly 
commonplace in today's society." 
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Here the District Court erred by ignoring the context of the statements, how extremely 
malicious they were, and the obviously severe emotional impact they would have on 
anyone in the context. Maliciously abusing a friend for wanting to be paid for a difficult 
job very well done is NOT commonplace in our society. 
Although Johnson admittedly was dealing with difficult emotional life issues, he was a 
sharp and talented hard working real estate agent when McPhee met him, which is why 
McPhee befriended Johnson, and made him like a member of his family. 
Johnson eventually showed McPhee a commercial real estate deal, which McPhee showed 
to Jack Vanderwaal, who later became JCAV in order to purchase the deal. JCAV made a 
quick million dollars otfthe deal Johnson showed them. (Vol. 2, p.379, 2nd paragraph) 
JCA V used the profit from that deal to leverage a loan for the man made lake. Johnson 
successfully set up the deal and worked for a year on it. McPhee had Johnson to thank 
more than anyone else for his lake deal, instead he taunted and abused Johnson, rather 
than pay him. He had refused to sign a contract when Johnson asked, and coerced 
Johnson to accept payment under the table .... " (Vol 1, p.171-172, pg. 50, ln.14 - pg 53, 
In. 2) 
The District Court stated: 
"Of course, assuming without deciding that McPhee made any such sexual 
comment to Johnson, this statement was made in 2003, and cannot be considered 
by the Court due to the applicable statute of limitations." 
The statute oflimitations does not bar the 2003 torture from being used as evidence 
regarding the question of whether McPhee was aware of Johnson's condition in 2005. 
Assuming McPhee diabolically psycho-sexually mind tortured Johnson, as Johnson 
testified and argued, it is entirely unreasonable to infer that McPhee could be oblivious to 
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Johnson's feeble condition, i.e. not only did McPhee see Johnson's condition, like 
everyone else, he maliciously caused it. 
The District Court has included irrelevant evidence and testimony in answering the 
altered question. 
The District Court stated: 
" ... Johnson himself initiated a number of the contacts occurring in 2005 and 2006, 
which he now complains resulted in his emotional distress. For example, Johnson 
complains about an altercation he had with McPhee at the Iron Horse Restaurant." 
This evidence was not offered to bolster or support any of Johnson's claims. Johnson felt 
his life was threatened, that he was in serious danger, and not knowing what to do about 
it, he notified the District Court in a non-sworn letter ofMcPhee's ominous and 
threatening manner. Unfortunately, this unswom letter is not in the record on appeal. In 
the letter, Johnson did not recount the entire altercation, nor did he do so in the affidavit 
he filed a few days later. (Vol 1, p. 103, 3rd paragraph) 
When he was questioned about the altercation as part of the respondents' 2nd deposition, 
he elaborated, simply to set the record straight, not to "complain". It happened long after 
everything alleged and complained about in the complaint, July 22, 2006, (Vol 1, p.198, 
pg 105, In. 13-17) and is therefore irrelevant. 
The District Court also erred by generally ignoring or missing the severity and 
extreme nature ofMcPhee's conduct, the case in general and Johnson's injury. 
The Court stated: 
"The record mainly consists of vague references to "abuse" and generalized 
assertions that Johnson's mental health suffered as a result of many factors in his 
life." 
Johnson testified that he psychosomatically experienced himself being violently sodomized 
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by Mike McPhee, that he soon became deranged, and due to his becoming derang~ 
every aspect of his life became a living nightmare, 24x7. This type of derangement is 
obviously not caused by divorce or any life issues, nor can it reasonably be inferred to be 
caused by "many factors". It was caused by McPhee' s torture(V ol. 2, p. 314) (Vol. 2, 
p.390, 3rd paragraph) (Vol. 2, p.368-369) 
When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not 
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for 
summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable 
inferent:es to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Loomis v. City of 
Haley, 119 Idaho 434, 807 p.2d 1272 (1991) (emphasis added) 
CONCLUSION 
McPhee' s infliction of emotional distress upon Johnson in 2005 was heinous and 
sociopathic in nature. McPhee was well aware that Johnson was a tortur~ deranged, 
crazy, pathetic, helpless beggar at the time he abused Johnson in 2005. He had to be 
aware that his abuse would be extremely hurtful to Johnson, given the context of 
friendship and the large real estate project Johnson worked so hard on. It cannot 
be reasonably inferred that McPhee was unaware of Johnson's condition, and therefore the 
respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment on the appellant's claim for Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress should be denied and remanded to the District Court for 
trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4 th day of September, 2012. 
ddi!MWn 
Appellant, pro se 
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